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In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Adolf A. Berle 
and Gardiner Means wrote about the separation of ownership from con-
trol in corporations.  They noted that the interests of the controlling di-
rectors and managers can diverge from those of the shareholder owners 
of the firm.1 
They wrote: 
It has been assumed that, if the individual is protected in the right 
both to use his own property as he sees fit and to receive the full 
fruits of its use, his desire for personal gain, for profits, can be re-
lied upon as an effective incentive to his efficient use of any indus-
trial property he may possess. 
In the quasi-public corporation, such an assumption no longer holds. 
As we have seen, it is no longer the individual himself who uses his 
wealth.  Those in control of that wealth, and therefore in a position 
to secure industrial efficiency and produce profits, are no longer, as 
owners, entitled to the bulk of such profits.  Those who control the 
destinies of the typical modern corporation own so insignificant a 
fraction of the company’s stock that the returns from running the 
corporation profitably accrue to them in only a very minor degree.  
The stockholders, on the other hand, to whom the profits of the cor-
poration go, cannot be motivated by those profits to a more efficient 
use of the property, since they have surrendered all disposition of it 
to those in control of the enterprise.  The explosion of the atom of 
property destroys the basis of the old assumption that the quest for 
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profits will spur the owner of industrial property to its effective 
use.2 
Berle and Means concluded that the separation of ownership from 
control would lead to the inefficient use of property because the motiva-
tion for the most efficient use of the property would no longer lie with 
those who profit from the enterprise.3  Harold Laski expressed a similar 
concern, focusing on those who control the corporations.  He suggested 
that the modern corporation may have to face control by dishonest man-
agers in addition to inefficiency. 
Under the modern company laws, any body of men may secure cap-
ital from its owners, with no sufficient guarantee either of a genuine 
service to be rendered or of a possible return on the investment.  
The company may be dishonest in its operation, or inefficient, with-
out the public being able at any point to have knowledge.  Its pro-
ceedings are wrapped in secrecy . . . .4 
Today’s scholars have similarly identified this separation of com-
ponents of ownership, naming the separation “decoupling.”  These scho-
lars note the decoupling of the “bundle of rights” represented by a tradi-
tional financial asset, such as a share of stock.  Professors Hu and Black 
noted, for example, that “[l]ongstanding legal and economic theories of 
the public corporation assume that the elements of this package of rights 
and obligations are generally bundled together—and in particular that 
voting rights are linked to an economic interest in the corporation, and 
usually held in proportion to that economic interest.”5  They then note 
that decoupling changes this package of rights. 
There are those who consider such a decoupling beneficial.  Others 
express the same concern that Berle and Means have expressed.  And 
depending on what one focuses on in viewing the pluses and minuses of 
these separations, one could reach different conclusions.  I reach a num-
ber of conclusions.  First, the separation of ownership from control 
creates the problems that Berle, Means, and Laski noted, regardless of 
how sophisticated, complex, or enticing the separation is.  That is, those 
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who control but do not own may control corporations inefficiently and 
sometimes dishonestly.  Second, there is a need to maximize the benefits 
from decoupling while minimizing the potential losses by those who do 
not have their “skin” in the losses.  Above all, the aspects of decoupling 
that pose a threat to the financial system must be controlled by private 
and public regulation.6  The time has come to raise the scholarly and 
public awareness about these issues. 
This Article is organized in three parts.  Part One examines the na-
ture of financial assets and their transition by market transactions from 
contracts to property.  The discussion highlights the gray areas which 
financial assets occupy in decoupling, falling within both contract and 
property law. 
Part Two describes four types of decoupled financial assets.  The 
first type separates into two financial assets: ownership benefits and 
ownership risks.  The presumed reduction of owners’ risks prompted 
some academics to justify reducing the owners’ protection.  I suggest that 
attempts to protect owners from ownership risk have failed.  Therefore, 
the suggestion was ill-conceived.  The second type of decoupling sepa-
rates into two financial assets: voting control and the ownership of finan-
cial assets.  It creates “empty votes.”  This innovation can be abused in 
many different ways, as has been shown.  The third type of decoupling 
is, in fact, coupling.  It is called “reverse exchange securities.”  The 
fourth form of decoupling is process-based securitization.  In fact, it may 
have been the first to appear publicly in the 1970s.  It offers advantages, 
but excesses have created great disadvantages.  Part Two concludes by 
noting that during the past thirty years, fundamental financial concepts 
and designs have been warped or eliminated.  Therefore, we must reana-
lyze the new financial assets to discover whether the decoupling of these 
assets produces the results Berle and Means were concerned with. 
Part Three poses a number of questions.  First, does decoupling un-
dermine the traditional property-type protections?  Second, does de-
coupling warrant more regulation?  Third, where is decoupling headed?7  
Fourth, what regulation can we expect for current decouplings?  And 
finally in this part, I argue that a radical regulatory view may be worth 
examining based on the principle that those who create benefits and risks 
for sale may not collect just part of the benefits.  They should have “skin 
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in the game” and bear a significant part of the risk as well; then, many of 
the problems that we reviewed might be ameliorated. 
I.  THE NATURE OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND THE APPLICATION OF 
CONTRACT AND PROPERTY LAWS 
A. What Are Financial Assets? 
I define financial assets to mean promises by one person or institu-
tion to another person or institution to pay money or deliver another fi-
nancial asset upon certain conditions, in exchange for money or another 
financial asset to be provided immediately or at a later date.  Financial 
assets differ from real assets and from money because they consist of 
promises; in other words, they are contractual promises.8 
Like real assets, some financial assets are tradable—for example, 
shares of stock—and some are not tradable—for example, loans.  This 
distinction is crucial because non-tradable financial assets are treated in 
law as contracts.  Tradable financial assets are treated in law as contracts 
as well, but the trading of these contracts is treated as the trading of 
property and is subject to conditions different from contract law. 
Contract law is designed to encourage interaction among fewer and 
more specific parties.9  Therefore, the parties may agree on any legal 
terms, impose limitations on the transfer of the contract rights to others 
and, with some exceptions, keep the terms of their relationships secret; 
contract law allows the parties to “personalize” their relationship.  In 
contrast, property law is designed to encourage the creation and devel-
opment of markets.10  Therefore, to reduce information costs, property 
law limits the deviations of terms classifying ownership property to ap-
proximately thirteen types.11  In addition, property law declines to en-
force a total prohibition on the transfer of property; such a prohibition is 
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ble”); id. § 3.1 (discussing future interests); Lawrence C. Becker, The Moral Basis of Property 
Rights, in NOMOS XXII 190–92 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
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deemed contrary to public policy.12  Further, property law imposes dif-
ferent degrees of publicity regarding transfers of property.13 
B.  Financial Assets Offer Promises and Combine Contract and Property 
Law 
One feature of financial assets is that they combine contract and 
property.  To be sure, property rights include the right to contract with 
others on various terms.  Financial assets, however, consist of the parties’ 
agreements.  The law rarely imposes conditions on the structure and 
terms of these agreements; they are, after all, contracts.  However, 
agreements subject to market trading must be suitable for trading, and 
market rules apply to tradable financial assets, including publicity of re-
levant information.  If, however, the number of parties is small, and the 
parties are wealthy and sophisticated, then more of the contract view will 
be taken, and the availability of legal intervention will be weakened. 
As noted, like property rights in real assets, trading in financial as-
sets is limited to a fairly small number of forms of alienation (e.g., sale, 
lease).  However, the content of financial assets, being contracts, remains 
unlimited.14  It is assumed that, regardless of their complexity, disclosure 
of the terms of these assets will suffice to protect the buyers and the trad-
ers from misunderstanding the benefits and risks that they are taking.  
One could argue that some real assets are highly complex as well.  After 
all, most buyers of electronic and other complex instruments do not un-
derstand what these instruments are made of.  However, most complex 
real assets are easier to evaluate: they work or do not work.  Because fi-
nancial assets consist of promises to do something in the future, it is far 
more difficult to predict whether and how the promises will be kept.  
And while there are often government and commercial standards for real 
assets, there are fewer government standards for financial assets; they 
have remained promises by contracts. 
In addition, historically, financial assets represented real assets.  Fi-
nancial assets later moved to representing financial assets that may or 
may not represent real assets.  This process resulted in rendering promis-
es very similar to, and as important as, real assets.  The process of parties 
betting on the outcome of a certain event concerning real assets or enter-
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prises, shifted to bets on the performance of financial assets in the market 
for financial assets.  The legal prohibition on betting has all but disap-
peared.15 
Today’s markets in financial assets have grown significantly.16  Ac-
companying or leading this growth was a rise in decoupling.  It is harder 
and costlier to decouple a real asset as compared to a financial asset.  
Decoupling is a step towards changing the terms of promises.  This step 
leads to the next step of creating a market in the decoupled pieces.  The 
separation is complete but, as we have experienced in the case of securi-
tization, it can breed the problem of sub-prime mortgages.  Thus, trading 
in financial assets is, in essence, trading in promises to do something in 
the future, often based on promises of yet another party’s future prom-
ise—a world of promise-based promises. 
II.  FOUR TYPES OF DECOUPLINGS 
A.  Ownership Without Risk 
A number of excellent and illuminating articles describe the 
changes that have occurred in the structure of financial assets in recent 
decades.  Professors Charles Whitehead and Ronald Gilson examined the 
decoupling of benefits and risks related to shares and the assimilation of 
shares to debt.17  Traditionally, share ownership was viewed as more 
risky than debt ownership.  The authors suggest that this higher risk justi-
fied the right to the following: residual profits; the right to vote for the 
directors of the corporation; the right to vote on some important deci-
sions concerning the future of the corporation; the right to sue derivative-
ly under certain circumstances; and the imposition of fiduciary duties on 
the directors, including fiduciary duties towards bondholders when the 
corporation became bankrupt and the bondholders became, in fact, 
shareholders.18 
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may bear high risk but are not entitled to residual profits or to control.  In addition, if risk is the 
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Professors Whitehead and Gilson noted that recently, the compo-
nents of shareholder risk, benefit, and control have been separated.  In 
Deconstructing Equity, they explain that, traditionally, “a firm’s scale 
and scope turned on the tradeoff between the gains from expansion and 
the agency costs of debt and equity. . . .”19  However, the past three dec-
ades gave rise to an “explosive growth in new instruments to facilitate a 
private owner’s purchase of risk bearing and liquidity in discrete slices,” 
by which executives may use “risk management”20 to hedge specific 
risks to which the corporations they manage are exposed.  Companies 
can transfer risk “by the slice, like New York pizza, rather than in the 
aggregate through common stock.”21  Therefore, private enterprise can 
fund working capital debt.  The authors conclude that reduction of risk 
for shareholders can align “management and shareholder incentives.”22  
How does risk slicing work? 
Weather derivatives, such as those underlying [Agricore United’s] 
insurance contract, can be more finely sliced into risks associated 
with temperatures in an identified region or group of cities, levels of 
snowfall and frost, and even the occurrence of hurricanes.  Through 
‘catastrophe bonds,’ investors can now take on risks as diverse as 
earthquakes in Southeast Asia, flooding in Great Britain, and 
windstorms in Japan.  At the cutting edge, economic derivatives 
permit financial intermediaries to precisely hedge their exposures to 
a growing array of macroeconomic risks, as evidenced by macroe-
conomic data releases—ranging from changes in U.S. employment 
rates to U.S. retail sales, industrial production, consumer prices, and 
economic growth—on which the value of those instruments is 
based.23 
These are impressive risk-reducing tools.  Yet, the theory that cor-
porations can reduce the shareholders’ risks and equate shares to debt has 
proven weak for two reasons.  First, management’s interests were not 
aligned with the interests of the shareholders.  Management had incen-
tives to increase the enterprises’ short-term risks and gain, and it did.  In 
fact, management and shareholder interests grew apart as shareholders 
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suffered greater longer-term losses while management reaped increased 
short-term gains.24  Consequently, shareholders bore higher, not lower, 
risks and losses.  Second, shareholder risks were not reduced because the 
risk coverage was not effective; the coverage relied on transfers of risk to 
unregulated entities and on faulty risk predictions. 
The risk coverage was not effective.  Risk-transfer tools work if, 
and only if, the promisors who offer to cover the risks are able to do so 
when the losses occur.  If the promisors have not appropriately calculated 
the probability of the losses which they offer to cover, or do not have the 
money to cover the losses of materialized risks that they correctly calcu-
lated, then the losses from the risks taken by corporate managers will be 
higher.  They will pay for risk coverage, which they do not receive, and 
expose their enterprise to higher risk and losses.  In sum, it is just as im-
portant to make sure that the risk will be actually covered as it is to splice 
it.  It seems that innovators are focusing more attention on splicing and 
less on assuring coverage. 
The new risk transfers rely not only on regulated institutions such 
as insurance companies, but also on promises of various unregulated ent-
ities.  It transpired that while the buyers of risk coverage increased their 
risks in reliance on the coverage, many promisors who were supposed to 
cover these financial risks could not make the risk-buyers whole.25 
Additionally, the risk-predictability was faulty.  The innovative new 
risk-transfers are similar to, but not quite the same as, traditional insur-
ance.  Traditional insurance is based on the law of large numbers. Even 
though an insurance company does not know when an insured will die, 
the company knows the percentage of persons of the insured’s age and 
circumstances who are very likely to die. The same system covers “lon-
gevity insurance”–annuities (the risk that the insured will outlive his or 
her savings). In addition, insurance schemes are regulated to prevent in-
surance companies from collecting premiums, speculating or wasting 
their assets, and failing to have sufficient resources to meet their future 
obligations. 
Many of the new risk-transfers cannot rely on the law of large 
numbers.  Financial models have failed to predict the financial risks.  
That is in part because the factors embedded in these models are not in-
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dependent of one another.  Combining the same risk-experience by many 
people allows an insurance company to cover the cost of those who expe-
rience the serious losses from the small payments made by those who did 
not suffer the losses. 
In practice, insurance is available only when the Law of Large 
Numbers is observed.  The law requires that the risk insured must 
be both large in number and independent of one another, like suc-
cessive deals in a game of poker. 
‘Independent’ means several things: it means that the cause of a 
fire, for example, must be independent of the actions of the policy-
holder.  It also means that the risks insured must not be interrelated, 
like the probable movement of any one stock at a time when the 
whole stock market is taking a nose dive, or the destruction caused 
by a war.26 
The failure of the new risk-prediction was due to the absence of in-
dependent risk factors: 
Wall Street and regulators relied on complex mathematical models 
that told financial institutions how much risk they were taking at 
any given time.  Since the 1990s, risk management on Wall Street 
has been dominated by a model called ‘value at risk’ 
(VaR). . . .  The model predicts with 99 percent probability that in-
stitutions cannot lose more than a certain amount of money.  Institu-
tions compare this ‘worst case’ with their actual capital and, if the 
amount of capital is greater, sleep soundly at night.  Regulators, 
knowing that the institutions used these models also slept sound-
ly . . . . 
Lurking behind the models, however, was a colossal conceptual er-
ror: the belief that risk is randomly distributed and that each event 
has no bearing on the next event in a sequence.  This is typically 
explained with a coin-toss analogy.  If you flip a coin and get 
‘heads’ and then do it again, the first heads has no bearing on 
whether the second toss will be heads or tails.  It’s a common falla-
cy that if you get three heads in a row, there’s a better-than-even 
chance that the next toss will be tails.  That’s simply not true . . . . 
But what if markets are not like coin tosses?  What if risk is not 
shaped like a bell curve?  What if new events are profoundly af-
fected by what went before?27 
                                                 
 26. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 204 (1998). 
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There was insufficient data and understanding to evaluate the pur-
ported risk-protection instruments and the incentives of management.  In 
sum, the shareholders of corporations whose management bought risk 
coverage bore higher, not lower, risks.  They were entitled to higher, not 
lower, controls over their management. 
B.  “Empty Voting”—Control by Voting Without Ownership 
Professors Henry Hu and Bernard Black noted the separation of 
shareholder ownership from voting.28  Corporate law generally makes 
voting power proportional to the number of shares a shareholder holds.  
While there are exceptions, the power to vote was linked to the economic 
commitment of the shareholders: share ownership.  Professors Henry Hu 
and Bernard Black noted that these days, voting can be decoupled by 
hedging, which “affects economic ownership”29 of the shares.  Voting 
can also be decoupled from ownership by borrowing voting shares and 
reserving the right to vote them.30  In a hedging case, the lender has “un-
disclosed economic ownership accompanied by informal voting rights.”31  
And in the share-borrowing case, the vote buyer has “more votes than 
economic ownership.”32 
Professors Hu and Black outline various ways in which this de-
coupling can be effected.33  One way is by enabling one person to borrow 
shares owned by another.  “Under standard lending arrangements, the 
borrower has voting rights but no economic ownership, while the lender 
has economic ownership without voting rights.”34  Thus, the borrower of 
the shares has voting rights for payment that is far lower than the price of 
buying the shares.  Such lending can be done pro forma by buying voting 
shares and selling them immediately thereafter.  The risk of ownership 
for a day does not match the impact of the voting on those who hold the 
shares far longer. 
An equity swap is another approach of decoupling votes from own-
ership.  In this arrangement, one party, such as a pension fund, holds 
shares while another person swaps to buy the shares but does not own 
them yet.  The buyer hopes that the price of the shares will fall and that 
he would be able to buy the shares for a lower price than the higher price 
that he agreed to sell the shares.  The person who is holding sold shares 
                                                 
 28. Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Mor-
phable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 907 (2006). 
 29. Id. at 818–19. 
 30. Id. at 816. 
 31. Id. at 907. 
 32. Id. at 812. 
 33. Id. at 907. 
 34. Id. at 816. 
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(for a fixed price) has no interest in the shares.  The person who bought 
the shares (but did not pay for them yet) has an interest in the vote but 
not in the economic attributes of the shares.  In this situation: 
a person with the long equity side (the ‘equity leg’) of the swap ac-
quires economic ownership of shares (but not voting rights) from 
the short side (the ‘interest leg’).  The short side often hedges its 
economic risk by holding shares, thus ending up with votes but no 
net economic ownership.35 
Other decoupling strategies exist as well.  One is relying on put and 
call options or single-stock futures.36  And yet another is “soft parking.”  
This technique works as follows: 
One party (the ‘parkee’) holds shares and thus apparent voting 
rights, but limited or no economic ownership.  The parkee is infor-
mally expected to either (1) vote as another party (the ‘parker’) 
would want, or informally requests, or (2) arrange, if the parker re-
quests, to unwind the parking transaction and return the voting 
rights to the parker.  The parkee will often be a derivatives dealer or 
bank.37 
For example, a Hungarian firm, MOL, defended itself from a takeover 
bid by launching a stock buyback program: 
MOL had bought back nearly half (48.8%) of its own previously 
outstanding shares, with 7.8% held directly and another 41% lent to 
two Hungarian banks.  MOL spent more than $2 billion buying it-
self. 
Decoupling played a critical part in MOL’s defense.  Under Hunga-
rian law, a firm cannot vote its own shares.  MOL avoided this limi-
tation by lending most of the repurchased shares to the two banks.  
The banks were nominally free to vote as they wished but could not 
sell the shares and were widely expected to vote them as MOL 
management wished.38 
A voting trust is another mechanism by which the voters (the trus-
tees) are not the true owners.  However, the owners who use this me-
chanism have a measure of control over the voting trustee, even though 
they are bound by the voting trust agreement.39  In addition, most corpo-
                                                 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Im-
portance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 638 (2008). 
 38. Id. at 647 (footnote omitted). 
 39. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 395, 400 (1983). (“The voting trust [is] a form of irrevocable proxy in which several share-
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rate laws require the apparent shareholder to disclose that the shareholder 
is a trustee.  In contrast, the MOL technique leaves the voter seen as the 
true owner.  Tender offers have been affected by “interposing a third ac-
tor between the bidder and individual target shareholders.”40  The result 
“is to require the shareholder to exercise his vote in order to remove the 
impediment to his ability to sell his stock.”41  In a recent case that was 
settled, vote decoupling was used by Perry Corp. to vote for a merger 
without disclosing its ownership in the merging companies, Mylan La-
boratories (Mylan) and King Pharmaceuticals (King).  In this case, Perry 
Corp. adopted a risk arbitrage spread trade involving the two companies.  
In 2004, Mylan announced an agreement to acquire King, subject to the 
approval of both Mylan and King shareholders.  Following this an-
nouncement, Perry began acquiring Mylan voting rights and at the same 
time used a short-sale hedging strategy to eliminate its financial exposure 
in these shares.  Perry purchased 9.89% of Mylan’s shares in foreign 
markets, or after hours on the over-the-counter market, in order to vote 
for the merger without publicly disclosing this purchase—disclosure of 
the purchase would have lowered the spread between the price of King 
and Mylan shares and would have reduced Perry’s profit.42 
                                                                                                             
holders convey their shares and the attached votes to a trustee who must vote them as a bloc in ac-
cordance with instructions.”).  See also id. at 410 (“Voting trusts are designed to inhibit transfers of 
control. The separation of control from the residual interest introduces a substantial, and in public 
firms unnecessary, agency cost.”); 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218(a) (2001) (authorizing voting 
trusts); Abercrombie v. Davies, 130 A.2d 338, 383–84 (Del. 1957) (voting trust not prevented by 
fact that trustees are under control of shareholders). 
 40. Thomas J. Andre, Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry into the Utility of Vote Buying in the Market 
for Corporate Control, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 533, 636 (1990). 
 41. Id.  For an example of abuse of voting power see Sommers v. Apalachicola Northern RR 
Co., 78 So. 25 (Fla. 1918).   See also Eric J. Pan, Single Stock Futures and Cross-Border Access for 
U.S. Investors, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 221, 253 (2008) (“In the face of growing demand by U.S. 
investors for access to foreign markets and pressure to restore U.S. capital markets competitiveness, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is gradually negotiating mutual recognition ar-
rangements with select foreign markets—arrangements that will allow foreign exchanges and bro-
kers to operate in the United States without direct SEC oversight. . . .  At 20 percent, the margins for 
[these instruments] are lower than the 50 percent margin normally imposed on securities trading, 
[though] higher than the margins imposed on other types of futures contracts. . . .  Nonetheless, the 
SEC and CFTC have refrained from using their authority to allow for [these instruments] on unregis-
tered securities because of Section 6(h)(3)(C) which provides that the requirements for listing of 
security futures products shall be no less restrictive than comparable listing standards for options 
traded on a national securities exchange or national securities association registered pursuant to 
Section 15A of [the Exchange Act].”) (third alteration in the original). 
 42. For the full settlement, see Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Perry Corp. 
with Disclosure Violations in Vote Buying Scheme (July 21, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press/2009/2009-165.htm.  On July 21, 2009, Perry Corp. settled with the SEC, agreeing to pay 
a $150,000 civil penalty for its failure to disclose that it acquired more than 5% of voting equity 
securities, allegedly in violation of Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act.  Id. 
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In a recent court case on vote decoupling, the trial judge for the 
Southern District of New York found that two hedge funds violated Rule 
13(d) by failing to disclose their beneficial ownership.43  In this case, the 
two hedge funds identified CSX Transportation (CSX) as a target for a 
leveraged buyout or a proxy fight to gain control of CSX.  The hedge 
funds began acquiring CSX shares (roughly 14.4%) without acquiring 
voting power.  To avoid disclosing that they hold more than 5% of CSX 
shares (which would have required disclosure of ownership), the funds 
distributed their shares among eight counterparties that were likely to 
vote with the funds.  CSX sued the funds and partners, alleging, among 
other things, that the funds failed to disclose their beneficial ownership 
of CSX.  The judge held that the two hedge funds had violated the dis-
closure rules, mainly under the “anti-evasion” rule.44 
There are other rules that can be circumvented by decoupling tech-
niques, such as: mandatory bid rules;45 “[s]tatutory, contractual [such as 
relying on put and call options or, where they exist, single-stock futures] 
and other limits on voting power;”46 income tax rules;47 “[r]ecapture of 
‘short-swing’ trading profits;”48 “[l]imits on short sales, or ‘margin bor-
rowing’ against the value of shares;”49 and antitrust rules.50  Vote de-
coupling may be used by corporations to vote for their own stock, which 
corporate law forbids.51  To the extent that the rules limit or direct voting, 
vote decoupling hides the true voter and its incentives, thereby circum-
venting the purpose of the rules. 
While the recent CSX decision might exert pressure on the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission to enact new disclosure rules,52 a number 
of corporations have already amended their bylaws to protect their share-
holders from empty voters.  For example, on March 27, 2008, Sara Lee 
(SLE) amended its bylaws, requiring that “a shareholder who nominates 
a new board member or submits a proposal that could alter the path of 
                                                 
 43. CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Hu & Black, supra note 5, at 669. 
 46. Id. at 670. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 670. 
 50. Id. at 671. 
 51. Hu & Black, supra note 37, at 642–43 (“[C]orporations can use decoupling techniques to 
allow insiders or other friendly third parties to vote shares with partial or no economic exposure” and 
“ward off changes in control.”). 
 52. See Hu & Black, supra note 5, at 669 (“Whatever the outcome of the appeal, the CSX case 
will likely put pressure on the SEC to adopt disclosure rules that explicitly address economic-only 
ownership.”). 
944 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:4 
the foodmaker’s business must also disclose if it has ‘hedged its owner-
ship’ or has ‘any short position’ in the stock.”53  Similarly, on February 
14, 2008, Coach (COH) amended its bylaws, “requiring that ‘any hedg-
ing activities engaged’ in by a stockholder must be divulged when a pro-
posal is submitted.”54  These changes are believed to protect shareholders 
from the dilution of their voting power by “empty voters” who have neg-
ative economic interests in the company.55 
Professors Hu and Black list several motivations that drive to de-
coupling shares from voting.  On one hand, “empty voting by insiders is 
likely to facilitate entrenchment and undermine external oversight.  Emp-
ty voting with negative economic interest is also troubling . . . .”56  On 
the other hand: 
[H]edge funds can use empty voting to influence governance at un-
derperforming corporations.  Oversight of company managers by 
large shareholders is often considered to be beneficial, but is often 
ineffective.  Empty voting could let votes move from less to better 
informed hands and, thus, could enhance the effectiveness of share-
holder oversight.57 
Because voting decouplings are so varied, it is difficult to evaluate 
them.  They can range from voting without any economic interest, to vot-
ing with an economic interest that contradicts the owners’ interest, to 
voting with an economic interest that conflicts with the interests of the 
chosen board of directors.  The board itself might have interests that con-
flict with the interests of the owners.  Much depends on the intentions 
and performance of the parties and the effect not only on the success and 
failure of the enterprise but on the financial markets.  Nonetheless, and 
perhaps because, voting decouplings can be both beneficial and destruc-
tive to shareholders’ ownership, the various methods of these mechan-
isms (and others that may be invented) should be disclosed.  And if their 
value is in their hidden effect, they should be disclosed to destroy this 
value.  Their benefits should be in their effect and the judgment of this 
effect should not be left to the holders of empty votes. 
                                                 
 53. Matt Andrejczak, Sara Lee, Coach Set Rules to Spot Shareholder Actions, 
MARKETWATCH, Apr. 2, 2008, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/sara-lee-coach-set-
rules-to-deter-devious-shareholders. 
 54. Id. 
 55. “[Sara Lee spokesperson Mike] Cummins said that the ‘interests of a stockholder who has 
hedged its Sara Lee stock ownership may not align with the interests of other stockholders, so we 
believe the additional information now required by the bylaws will enable all stockholders to make 
better-informed decisions.’” Id. 
 56. Hu & Black, supra note 28, at 820. 
 57. Id. at 820–21 (footnotes omitted). 
2010] The New Financial Assets 945 
C.  Reverse Exchange Securities 
“Reverse exchange securities” is another name for “reverse conver-
tibles.”  These securities combine into one financial asset two separate 
traditional bundles of benefits and risks.  The terms of this third type of 
security seem complex, but after reflection, they are self-explanatory.  
These assets constitute part bond and part share.  While the promise of 
returns is similar to a bond, the payment of the invested capital presents a 
share.  Figuring out the risk and benefit of such a combination becomes 
complicated because the issuer of the bond part is different from the is-
suer of the share part.  The results of the separation of ownership of these 
two financial assets from the two kinds of risk that they pose are rich in 
possibilities.  The reverse convertible bond issuer may have far more 
information about the share issuer than the buyer of the bond may have. 
Reverse convertibles combine the features of debt with the features 
of equity.  The instruments are interest-paying—similar to debt.  But the 
amount lent and repaid is linked to the value of particular shares or 
another event.  The “reverse exchange securities,” or so-called “bonds,” 
issuer does not promise to pay back the amounts the bond buyer had 
paid.  Instead, the bond buyer is promised on the payment date the price 
of a particular equity price or the financial value of a market event, such 
as future interest rates.  The buyer will not gain if the stock price rises.  
The issuing company will not pay more than the price to the shareholders 
at the time the “bond” was issued.  But if the stock price falls, the inves-
tors will lose and the issuing company will pay less—the lower price.  
For example, the instruments are sold for $100 and bear 10% interest for 
six months—an unusually high return.  These instruments are pegged to 
the price of certain equity securities at a specified date.  The securities 
are issued not by the “bond” issuer but by an unrelated issuer (for exam-
ple, a corporation or a bank).  If the price of the equity security rises, the 
holder of the reverse convertible will not benefit from the rise.  The 
holder will be paid the $110; that is, the principal ($100) plus interest 
($10).  If, however, the price of the equity security is lower than the pre-
determined price, the holder of the reverse convertible will receive the 
equity securities rather than cash.  Thus, if the issuer is a corporation, the 
corporation will not issue dividends to the shareholders (reflecting the 
profits) but will promise a fixed and anticipated interest.  However, the 
amount lent is not fixed.  That amount is linked to the future value of the 
specified equity securities in a certain way.  The “bond” holder will not 
benefit from the higher price of the securities, but will have to accept the 
securities themselves if their price is below the bond principal amount 
($100).  “The net result of this credit-enhancing relationship would be to 
reduce financial constraints and hence (perceived) default risk for the 
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sponsoring firm [the issuer] . . . .”58  Bondholders gain a higher interest 
rate presumably to compensate for possible loss of the amount they paid 
for the bonds or shares.59 
Corporations use the net proceeds of the issued bonds for general 
corporate purposes, including “additions to working capital, investment 
in or extension of credits to [the corporation’s] subsidiaries and the re-
payment of indebtedness” as well as hedging.60  The instruments seem to 
be used by issuers as “other capital-raising securities.” 61  The first ques-
tion is whether there is sufficient data and understanding to evaluate 
these instruments and anticipate the incentives of the issuer’s manage-
ment.  A second question is whether the information available to the is-
suer of the bonds concerning the securities, to which the payment of the 
bond is linked, is available to the buyers.  Finally, it could be that the 
issuer of the “bond” can also affect the price of the other entity’s shares; 
for example, if the issuer is a significant lender of the company or sold 
its shares short and hopes for the price of the shares to fall. 
D.  Securitization and Structured Finance 
Securitization is a process by which individual and unmarketable 
debts or loans are pooled and converted into marketable securities.  The 
process starts with debt creation such as loans, future lawyer fees, lease 
payments, or credit card receivables.  The next step is the creation of an 
institutional intermediary, such as a trust, a corporation, or a limited 
partnership, called a Special Purpose Vehicle (“SPV”) or a Special Pur-
pose Entity (“SPE”).  The third step is the transfer of the debt to the SPV.  
The fourth step is the issuance of securities by the SPV.  The securities 
entitle the owners to a portion of the cash-flow from the aggregate debt 
held by the SPV.62 
The decoupling in securitization is similar to the reverse ex-
change securities: both are decoupling by coupling.  They combine 
debt and equity.  But while the reverse exchange securities combine debt 
                                                 
 58. Bruce A. Benet et al., Gains from Structured Product Markets: The Case of Reverse-
Exchangeable Securities (RES), 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 111, 125 (2006).  See, e.g., id. app. A. 
 59. Id. at 114.  Such instruments were issued by ABN-AMRO Bank, a leading financial institu-
tion based in the Netherlands.  Id. 
 60. Id. at 125 (quoting the REX.S prospectus). 
 61. Id. at 125 (“RES are somewhat more attractive to issue than straight debt. When issuing 
straight debt, for example, the firm must reward investors for default risk (i.e., the risk it may not be 
able to make full face value repayment at maturity). In the case of RES, however, we conjecture that 
default risk may well be lower than for comparable ABN-AMRO bonds. . . . [There can be] a signif-
icant positive correlation between RES repayment obligations and sponsoring firm cash flows at 
liability expiration.”). 
 62. See generally 1 TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION § 6.3 (Ann Taylor Schwing ed., 2d ed. 
2005). 
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and equity into one security, securitization transforms debts into securi-
ties.  In both cases, the difficulty of evaluating the level of risk of the 
debt is compounded by the difficulty of evaluating the risk of the securi-
ties which represent portions of the debts.  In both, risk and ownership 
are decoupled. 
Securitization provides many benefits.  It allows enterprises that 
need capital to borrow not only from the banks but also from investors in 
the markets.  It also allows borrowing enterprises to provide investors a 
lower-risk debt by separating the borrowers businesses, which can be 
risky, from the debts due to these borrowers from their customers (which 
may be far less risky).  For example, while construction firms can be 
risky enterprises, if their income is based on rentals of apartment houses, 
the rentals may be far safer than the construction business.  Securitization 
enables the business enterprise to raise funds by transferring the right to 
the rentals and mortgages on the real estate to investors and, thereby, 
borrow at a lower rate.63 
Yet, securitization may pose, for investors, a somewhat greater risk 
because the underlying debt is difficult to evaluate.  In reverse exchange 
securities, the issuer is one source of risk and the issuer of the securities 
or the market event is another.  In securitization, because the debt is va-
ried, it may be more difficult to evaluate the risk associated with the cash 
flow of the aggregate debt. In the past, rating agencies have assigned the 
level of risk to securities issued by the SPVs.  The rating was sometimes 
required by law.64  But the risk of the debts rose with the pressures to sell 
more asset backed securities.65 
When banks and unregulated entities made mortgage loans and 
pooled them into SPVs that issued securities, their profits derived not 
from the interest of the debt they held, but by charging intermediation 
costs of lending, structuring the securitization, or both.  Hence, the crea-
tors of debt securities for sale had incentive to produce as many securi-
ties as possible.  Structures became very complex, and the rating agen-
cies functioned under conflicts of interest: they were paid by the issuers 
of the securities that they rated.  Consequently, a bubble was created in 
SPV issued securities based on low quality mortgage loans.  At some 
point, the bubble in mortgage backed securities exploded (as all bubbles 
do).  The year 2008 saw the decline in real estate prices, the drying up of 
                                                 
 63. Id. at 212–13. 
 64. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (2009) (exempting SPVs from the regulation of the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, and imposing a condition of rating on the SPVs’ assets). 
 65. However, as the economic crisis has shown, the rating agencies’ ratings did not reflect this 
increased risk, causing securities such as mortgage-backed securities to be overvalued. 
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the market in securitized mortgages, and the adverse effect on the finan-
cial system and economy.66 
The trend in the financial markets has been toward the freedom to 
design and slice benefits, risks, and controls or powers (the contract part 
in the financial assets), and to create markets to trade in them (the market 
part in the financial assets).  Legally, one would redefine the trend as the 
freedom to design various rights and liabilities for trading in open or re-
stricted markets.  These tendencies were encouraged based on the as-
sumption that market prices of financial assets closely reflect the state of 
the economy and are more accurate than any other valuation.  It was also 
assumed that markets are preferable to institutional intermediation, such 
as banks and insurance companies.  Institutions may give the impression 
of low risk.  Their structure, however, is usually risky.  If they fail, they 
present significant risks to the financial system.  In addition, it was as-
sumed that market regulation, mostly by disclosure, is preferable to gov-
ernment substantive regulation. Even speculation is preferable to fixed 
values that do not reflect reality as much as the markets do. 
These assumptions were flawed.67  Market prices did not reflect the 
state of the economy but rather a bubble, rising high in part because of 
securities sales forces’ drives and benefits.  With the bubble rise, markets 
have not proven a preferable intermediary as compared to institutional 
intermediaries.  When institutional intermediaries became active in the 
markets as market intermediaries, both the institutions’ and markets’ sta-
bility seemed to be harmed.  Thus, some argue that the optimal structure 
of a financial system is separate markets and institutional intermediaries 
in clear competition among the two segments.  The assumption that regu-
lation is unnecessary, and if it is necessary, it should follow the “mar-
kets,” has proven to be less than perfect.68  Competition did not lead to 
greater efficiency or more balanced markets.  On the contrary, it seems to 
have produced excesses that led to a crash.  The regulators’ “hands off” 
attitude seems to have allowed a tremendous bubble and its inevitable 
crash that has hit not only the financial system but the economy as well.  
Whether regulation could have prevented this disaster is, of course, de-
                                                 
 66. See TAMAR FRANKEL & MARK FAGAN, LAW AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: 
SECURITIZATION AND ASSET BACKED SECURITIES: LAW, PROCESS, CASE STUDIES, AND 
SIMULATIONS 88–99, 148–54 (2009). 
 67. See The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing of the H. Comm. on 
Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Alan Greenspan, former 
Chairman, Fed. Reserve).  In response to a question by Chairman Waxman regarding whether Dr. 
Greenspan’s free, competitive markets philosophy led him to make decisions he wishes he had not 
made, Dr. Greenspan responded, “[Y]es, I’ve found a flaw. . . . That’s precisely the reason I was 
shocked, because I had been going for 40 years or more with very considerable evidence that [my 
ideology] was working exceptionally well.”  Id. 
 68. See, e.g., id. 
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batable because we cannot reproduce the alterative scenario of a regula-
tory regime. 
In March 2010, Judge Richard Posner wrote a very thoughtful ar-
ticle which suggests that the main focus of the law should be making 
banks less affected by the collapse of other financial intermediaries.  He 
argued that we should make “banks safe by confining them to their tradi-
tional activities, mainly the lending of federally insured deposits to small 
businesses and consumers and the purchase of federal and state govern-
ment securities.”69  The judge suggests a structural change to follow the 
functional purpose of banks and regulating other lenders.  “Combining 
safe and risky financial activities in the same firm,” wrote Judge Posner, 
“endangers safety.”  Therefore, he suggests not shrinking the banks but 
requiring them and their managements to be absolutely risk averse.70 
Does this discussion veer us from the issue of ownership and con-
trol as well as decoupling of ownership from control?  To some extent it 
does, if we focus only on the corporate universe.  However, investors in 
asset-backed securities have been separated from the source of their in-
come and capital as well.  Only this source is not an individual or group 
of power holders.  This source is the intermediaries who take no owner-
ship and no control.  This is the ultimate decoupling not only of those 
who own from those who owe but mainly from those who designed the 
system, benefited from the design, and left the losses to both the lenders 
(the investors) and the borrowers.  Thus, in looking for solutions to 
strengthen the ownership from control we must consider the system as a 
whole.  Judge Posner’s article focuses on the intermediaries and, in fol-
lowing Berle and Means’s ideas, we should not ignore this context as 
well. 
III. WHAT COULD BE DONE TO AVOID THE PROBLEMS THAT ARISE 
FROM DECOUPLING AND COUPLING WHILE MAINTAINING THEIR 
BENEFITS? 
A. Does Decoupling Undermine the Traditional Property-Type 
Protections? 
“Property-type protections” are the legal protections of property 
owners or shareholders.  Some types of decoupling undermine the tradi-
tional property-type protections at a certain stage of the decoupling 
process.  For example, when derivatives cover various risks of an enter-
prise, they might reduce an enterprise risk.  Therefore, even if ownership 
                                                 
 69. Richard Posner, In Volcker We Trust, AM. LAW., Mar. 2010, at 53, 54. 
 70. Id. at 80. 
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and control of the enterprise are separate, the enterprise provides owners 
with benefits with lower risks (minus management costs).  Hence, Pro-
fessors Gilson and Whitehead suggest that because such derivatives pro-
duce ownership without risk, “property-type protections” for the owners 
are not justified; shareholders not bearing risk should not be entitled to 
voting rights and other controls over management. 
However, if the risk coverage is itself risky, then the question of 
property-type protection rises again.  Property-type protection by risk 
coverage can be a mirage.  If the promises of risk coverage are not solid-
ly backed, and if no regulation covers the promisors or enforces their 
obligations in any other way, the risk transfers and “protections” are 
empty promises.  As noted, historically, coverage promises were based 
on faulty calculations and assumptions.  The owners could not and can-
not evaluate the risk coverage at a reasonable cost.  In fact, the very na-
ture of financial assets undermines traditional property-type protections.  
Promises cannot be touched, seen, checked upon receipt, or tested for 
reliability.  The reliability of promises depends on the promisors’ ability 
and tendency to honor their obligations.  In addition, the ability of promi-
sors to honor their promises depends on future—mostly unpredictable—
events affecting the promisors and their promises.  The events in the 
years 2008 and 2009 suggest that market trading in risk-covering prom-
ises needs strengthening.  This conclusion is reflected in the congres-
sional and regulatory proposals that are currently being considered.71  As 
the 2008 crash demonstrated, risk protection has not been what it seemed 
to be.  Hence, owner protection should be strengthened rather than wea-
kened. 
The danger that controlling parties without ownership will adopt 
risks at the expense of the owners and the financial system is greater than 
imagined.  Protections of owners and the system are weaker than im-
agined.  Thus, the owner protections should be tighter, not lighter.  In 
addition, the assumption that an ability to cover the issuing enterprises’ 
risks reduces the risks of the enterprise-shareholders is flawed.  Share-
holders are always the last to get paid.  They are paid after the Internal 
Revenue Service, the employees, the managers, the creditors and other 
claimants.  Therefore, the suggestion that shareholder voting and other 
protective rights against those who control their money and assets should 
be weakened is not convincing. 
In addition, shareholders bear not only the enterprise’s risks, but al-
so the risk that the controlling managers might abuse their power and 
                                                 
 71. See, e.g., Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009, H.R. 3795, 111th Cong., 
available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/titleVII.pdf. 
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misappropriate the shareholder assets.  Therefore, even if derivatives 
protect the shareholders against enterprise risk, derivatives do not protect 
the shareholders from misappropriation of their property by manage-
ment. 
This issue is fundamental.  America is a capitalistic country.  The 
issue is not one of enterprise risk, but one of entitlement to ownership of 
the enterprise assets.  Those who own have the right to ultimate control 
and to the residual profits.  Those who serve, no matter how able, crea-
tive, productive and innovative they are, do not and should not have ul-
timate control and right to ownership.  Similarly, even if lenders bear 
high risk of loss, they are not entitled to the control or the residual profits 
of the enterprise.  If low risk is linked to lower control, the rationale is 
that there would be lower concern that controlling managers will abuse 
their power.  Unfortunately that has not been the case.  Besides, the Unit-
ed States could end up with managers—those who serve—as owners.  
This result is a different societal structure than capitalism.  Regardless of 
how high or low a risk the financiers of enterprises pose, they, and not 
those who manage the enterprises, must have ultimate control.  Other-
wise, we will move to a system where service substitutes for capital. 
Other decouplings, such as “naked voting rights,” undermine 
property-type protections for owners.  These techniques hand control 
to those who do not bear ownership risk and have no fiduciary duties to 
owners or to the aggregate of owners.  In these cases, traditional proper-
ty-type protections disappear altogether.  Empty voting rights can be held 
by those who reap benefits from control at the risk of others and gain 
from destroying current ownership of the enterprise.  These are the situa-
tions which have been, and should be prohibited altogether—perhaps 
with the exception of a voting trust and full disclosure of the possible use 
of the votes.72 
Reverse exchange securities open the door to the weakening of 
ownership.  First, they may mislead debtors into believing that they have 
a bond instead of a share.  Most critically, those who take the risk of a 
share have no iota of the control or protections that accompany owner-
ship.  In addition, these holds take the pure risk of the ownership of the 
shares and none of the benefits.  These “bonds” operate as Berle and 
                                                 
 72. Interview with Nicholas Valerio III, associate professor of finance at Emory University’s 
Goizueta Business School, Risk, the Derivatives Market, & Proposed Regulatory Reforms: What’s 
Ahead?, (July 16, 2009), http://knowledge.emory.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1247.  Currently, when 
listed derivatives are traded, there are mechanisms to reduce this risk, such as clearing corporations, 
margin requirements (i.e., a financial deposit), and price discovery (which can occur in the public 
market).  Id.  In OTC markets, each party has burden of identifying the financial stability of the other 
and “there is no pricing transparency, nor centralized reporting.”  Id. 
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Means’s ultimate model: ownership losses, but no benefits and no con-
trol. 
Securitization undermines property-type protections in another 
way.  Those who create the financial assets that end up in the hands of 
owners have little interest in reducing the risks from these assets, and a 
strong incentive to hide the risks and sell the assets as high quality assets.  
The ultimate owners incur high costs in determining the risk involved in 
the assets.  In addition, securitization undermines the traditional proper-
ty-type protection to the extent that the owners are unable to negotiate 
with the source of the payments—the borrowers—and no managers exist 
to account and answer for the shoddy assets or negotiate with the bor-
rowers.  The creators and sellers of risky financial assets have incentives 
to avoid and hide the risk.  In all of these cases, unless there are different 
types of protections, owners remain with no or weakened protections.  In 
securitization, the connection between the borrowers, the promisors, and 
the owners of the promises is severed.  In fact, the process of securitiza-
tion closely resembles mutual funds, except that this process is unregu-
lated.  In securitization, it seems that no one has full voting rights.  There 
is no party that can negotiate changes in the terms of the borrowers’ 
loans.  The bankruptcy of millions of borrowers is an inefficient form of 
renegotiation. 
The only stable indicators of decoupling seem to be short-term 
benefits for intermediaries (the innovators) and, perhaps, for owners 
that continuously trade in the asset backed securities.  Long-term 
owners, even sophisticated owners, are less able to evaluate the risk of 
decoupled and re-coupled financial assets.  For example, in the case of 
market instruments that combine bonds and equity, the owners cannot 
discover the use of these instruments and current regulation does not re-
quire the sellers or issuers to disclose their other financial positions and 
future seemingly unrelated activities.  Had this information been availa-
ble, owners would have understood their risk and thus eliminated the 
benefits gained by the issuers, the sellers, and the innovators. 
B.  Does Decoupling Warrant More Regulation? 
Not all de-couplings require more regulation but some require 
enforcement of the current law.  For example, abuse of control without 
risk, which is demonstrated by vote buying or renting (or a “second 
length ownership”), need not involve new regulation.  Rather, vote buy-
ing is prohibited in corporate law and in the political arena.  In the case 
of decouplings that result in the same separation, it was allowed perhaps 
because the vote buying involved market transactions (for example, bor-
rowing).  “Empty voting” should not be allowed and can be easily prohi-
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bited by applying current legal principles.  The prohibition on vote buy-
ing in the political arena should apply to any vote-ownership without 
ownership, no matter how it is acquired, so long as it is not accompanied 
by owner risk and rewards.  No payment should be allowed for any vote 
of any corporation unless accompanied by ownership.  And just as voting 
trusts require disclosure, so should similar arrangements in decoupling. 
Addressing past innovations may help, but only in part. Some 
past innovations, especially those that caused significant losses, will not 
be repeated soon; other innovations will emerge. To be sure, regulation 
increases the cost for all intermediaries and reduces their profits.  How-
ever, as recent events have shown, market competition does not work to 
prevent abuse.  Intermediaries are unlikely to compete for lower fees or 
on strengthening property-protections. 
In addition, so long as innovations are used in one-to-one rela-
tionships, a regulatory reform is more costly and not as necessary.  
So long as innovations are used in one-to-one relationships, there is low-
er payoff for regulatory reform, unless the owners sustain significant 
losses from the innovations and seek to escape the financial system for a 
shorter or longer period.  This escape can bring down the system.  Inno-
vations used in the markets might cause significant failure as well.  Un-
less promises are kept, a “run” on the promisees or on the promisors is 
likely. 
The ultimate payoff for a regulatory reform is higher if the owner 
losses affect the entire financial system (or the economy).  When owners 
may sustain sufficiently great losses, they might seek to escape the finan-
cial system for a shorter or longer period.  This escape can dry up the 
markets and bring down the system.  Effective regulation might reduce 
the risks of innovations, but not necessarily.  Regulators may exercise 
judgment in evaluating the dangers from the innovations and allow some 
with or without conditions.  In addition, regulation imposes costs, and 
these should be related to the cost-benefit analysis of regulation. 
Regulation of derivative over-the-counter markets (“OTC”) 
must be, and is likely to be, tightened.  This regulation will help assure 
the enforcement of promises, either by the government (threat) or by the 
group of derivative traders (having “skin” in the risk created by others).  
In her testimony before the House Committee on Agriculture, SEC 
Chairman Mary L. Schapiro noted: “The derivatives market has grown 
enormously since the late 1990s to approximately $450 trillion of out-
standing notional amount in June 2009.”73  This market presents systemic 
                                                 
 73. Testimony Concerning the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009 Before the 
H. Comm. on Agriculture, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts092209mls.htm. 
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risk (e.g., risk concentration by significant leverage).  The markets “be-
have unexpectedly in times of crisis.”74  While “credit default swaps 
(CDS) . . . can reduce certain types of risk, [they can] caus[e] others, . . . 
heightened by the lack of regulatory oversight of dealers and other par-
ticipants in this market.”75  The result can be “inadequate capital and risk 
management standards. . . . OTC derivatives markets directly affect the 
regulated securities and futures markets by serving as a less regulated 
alternative for engaging in economically equivalent activity.”76  This can 
lead to “a flow of funds out of the regulated markets and into the unregu-
lated shadow markets. . . .  These issues must be addressed, and I am 
committed to working closely with this Committee, the Congress, the 
Administration, and the CFTC to close this gap and restore a sound 
structure for U.S. financial regulation.”77  The Administration’s bill 
“would mandate clearing and trading of all standard over-the-counter 
products, and setting capital and margin requirements for dealers.”78 
There is a proposal to create one central clearing house for trading stan-
dardized derivatives which will guarantee performance.  This entity 
should be able to manage risk by daily cash margins.79  Other proposals 
to improve disclosure and operational processes “have been tried before 
with limited success.”80 
                                                 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (“For example, CDS permit individual firms to obtain or reduce credit risk exposure to a 
single company or a sector, thereby reducing or increasing that risk. In addition to obtaining or re-
ducing exposure to credit risk, a CDS contract participant will take on counterparty and liquidity risk 
from the other side of the CDS. Through CDS, financial institutions and other market participants 
can shift credit risk from one party to another, and thus the CDS market may be relevant to a particu-
lar firm’s willingness to participate in an issuer’s securities offering or to lend to a firm. However, 
CDS can also lead to greater systemic risk by, among other things, concentrating risk in a small 
number of large institutions and facilitating lax lending standards more generally.”). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Sarah N. Lynch, CFTC’s Gensler Calls for Broad OTC Derivatives Regulations (Sept 14, 
2009), http://www.fxstreet.com/news/forex-news/article.aspx?StoryId=c5966843-5823-4896-b131-
80b35876387e (“The bill would give the [Commodity Futures Trading Commission] and the [SEC] 
joint authority to patrol the markets and set capital requirements in some cases for non-bank deriva-
tive dealers. Regulators would also collect detailed information about the trading of customized 
products as well.”). 
 79. See, e.g., Posting of Yves Smith to Naked Capitalism, Satyajit Das Weighs In on OTC 
Derivatives Proposals and Finds Them Wanting, http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2009/07/satyajit-
das-weighs-in-on-otc.html (July 17, 2009, 1:36  a.m.) (quoting Das) (“Failure to meet a margin call 
requires the [central counterparty] to close out the position and offset any losses against existing 
collateral.  The level of initial collateral posted must cover the fall in value from the last margin call.  
Traders want the maximum amount of leverage by reducing the amount [they post in cash].”) 
 80. Id. (quoting Das). 
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Focusing on the OTC,81 the Treasury suggested derivative regula-
tion by “[r]equiring central clearing and exchange trading of standar-
dized OTC derivatives; . . . higher capital and margin requirements for 
non-standardized derivatives; . . . [b]roadening the definition of standar-
dized OTC derivatives;”82 and “ensuring that OTC derivatives are not 
marketed inappropriately to unsophisticated parties.”83  This proposal 
emphasizes the regulation and oversight of speculation.84  In September 
23, 2009, Senator Jack Reed introduced the Comprehensive Derivatives 
Regulation Act of 2009.  The Act would: 
[c]lear standardized credit default swaps (CDS) and other unregu-
lated derivatives through a clearinghouse . . . and allow regulators to 
oversee new derivatives products that may arise in the future; 
[e]stablish robust capital and margin requirements for derivatives 
dealers and other major market participants, and establish higher 
standards for derivatives products not traded on clearinghouses; es-
tablish new conduct, recordkeeping and reporting requirements for 
firms, intended to protect investors from abusive practices and pro-
vide regulators and investors with extensive information regarding 
derivatives transactions and positions across the financial sector; 
[p]rovide regulators with new authority to set position limits and 
oversee the marketing of derivatives products to unsophisticated in-
vestors, and . . . combat fraud and manipulation . . . .85 
There are several suggestions to strengthen the Treasury’s proposal.86 
Promoting market integrity.  Gary Gensler noted that there is a 
need to “promote greater market integrity and improve market transpa-
                                                 
 81. Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009, H.R. 3795, 111th Cong., available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/titleVII.pdf. 
 82. Posting of Anjali Desai to Financial Markets Blog, U.S. Treasury Delivers Proposed Legis-
lation on OTC Derivatives to Congress, http://www.alston.com/financialmarketscrisisblog/blo 
g.aspx?entry=2433 (Aug. 12, 2009, 10:19 p.m.). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  The Treasury proposed amendments in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and other 
relevant acts.  See also Posting of Anjali Desai to Financial Markets Blog, U.S. Treasury Announces 
Proposed Regulatory Framework for OTC Derivatives, http://www.alston.com/financialmarkets 
crisisblog/blog.aspx?entry=2077 (May 13, 2009, 7:07 p.m.). 
 85. Posting of Anjali Desai to Financial Markets Blog, Senator Reed Introduces Comprehen-
sive Derivatives Regulation Act of 2009, http://www.alston.com/financialmarketscrisisblog 
/?entry=2585 (Sept. 23, 2009, 5:51 p.m.).  In response, market participants expressed concerns about 
increased regulatory costs.  See, e.g., Posting of Christy Prendergast to Financial Markets Blog, 
House Committee Holds Hearings on Regulation of Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 
http://www.alston.com/financialmarketscrisisblog/blog.aspx?entry=2584 (Sept. 23, 2009, 5:28 p.m.). 
 86. See, e.g., Testimony Concerning the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009 
Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, supra note 73. 
956 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:4 
rency.”87  He pointed to two regimes—one regulating derivatives dealers, 
and the other regulating the derivatives markets.88  This can be done by 
“extend[ing] the regulatory regimes of the Commodity Exchange Act 
(“CEA”) and the federal securities laws,” thus covering the entire mar-
ketplace.89 
Professor Mark Roe focused on the intermediaries’ incentives.  He 
noted that “[d]erivatives, repos and financial swaps . . . protect against 
foreign exchange and interest rate fluctuations . . . and in guarantees 
against loan defaults” obtain a favorable treatment in bankruptcy law.90  
“It has been a successful lobbying effort for this part of the American 
financial industry: priority treatment is important for the industry, but not 
well enough understood to engage much public attention beyond the fi-
nancial press.”91  Professor Roe argues against this favoritism.  The fa-
vored treatment is so great, he wrote, that “financial players can set up 
deals so that they beat all other creditors if the other side of the deal goes 
bankrupt.”92  Professor Roe predicts that if these instruments are not 
awarded this favored treatment, the “players . . . will act differently.  If 
they know that their payments from a counterparty might be clawed back 
if the counterparty goes bankrupt, they will keep a sharper eye on the 
solvency of their counterparties, because a lower priority will not hurt 
them as long as their counterparties stay solvent.”93 
The states’ regulation of derivatives is a hybrid of institutional and 
functional regulation causing “intense legal and jurisdictional uncertainty 
and high regulatory compliance costs.” 94  Yet, not all firms or deriva-
tives must be regulated.  One regulator is not necessarily better than mul-
tiple regulators, and functional regulation is not inherently preferable to 
institutional regulation.95  Other academics suggested in a 1994 article 
that the public policy rationale for increasing the regulation of deriva-
tives has “little or no economic basis. . . .  Derivatives do not pose great-
                                                 
 87. Gary Gensler, Thoughts on Comprehensive Market Regulation, (Sept. 23, 2009), 
http://www.commodityonline.com/news/Thoughts-on-comprehensive-market-regulation-21352-3-
1.html. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Mark Roe, End Bankruptcy Priority for Derivatives, Repos and Swaps, FT.COM, Dec. 15, 
2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/16da702e-ea41-11de-aeb6-00144feab49a.html?nclick_check=1 
(last updated Dec. 16, 2009). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Christopher Culp, Derivatives Regulation: Problems and Prospects, Competitive Enter-
prise Institute, Mar. 31, 1998, http://cei.org/gencon/005,01275.cfm. 
 95. Id. 
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er risk than other financial activities.”96  There are no unique risks to us-
ers of derivatives.  And in 1994, the regulatory framework was adequate.  
Institutional and functional regulation existed.  This bifurcated frame-
work renders derivatives regulation complex.  This observation is proba-
bly true when one ignores human incentive and the division of risk and 
return. 
Fiduciary law imposes on money managers and corporate man-
agers a duty of care.  The two cases discussed below suggest that “regu-
lation cannot substitute for sound management practices.  At the same 
time, government policymakers can act to minimize the potential for dis-
ruption to financial markets by promoting laws and policies that minim-
ize legal risk.”97  “In 1992, MGRM [a subsidiary of MG] began imple-
menting an aggressive marketing program in which it offered long-term 
price guarantees on deliveries of gasoline, heating oil, and diesel fuels 
for up to five or ten years.”98  The program included innovative contracts 
which MGRM hedged.  This hedging program would have generated 
huge losses under certain conditions.  When the conditions occurred, 
MG’s board moved quickly, removed the top manager and took other 
arguably hasty actions.99  In the second case, Barings Bank perished be-
cause one of its unsupervised traders speculated and produced enormous 
losses.100  Both cases involve exchange-traded derivatives contracts, and 
in both cases, senior management has been criticized for lack of strict 
supervision.  Yet the two managements reacted differently.  MG’s man-
agement has been faulted “for overreacting to the large margin calls 
faced by one of its subsidiaries . . . .”101  “Barings’s management has 
been faulted for being overly complacent in the face of a large number of 
warning signs.”102 
In both cases, management should have better understood their ac-
tivities and their risks.103  In MG’s case, “the sheer scale of its U.S. oil 
subsidiary’s marketing program exposed the firm to large risks.  Al-
though there is a great deal of disagreement over the efficacy of the 
hedging strategy employed by [MG],”104 it seems that MG’s board failed 
                                                 
 96. Christopher L. Culp, Regulating Derivatives: The Current System and Proposed Changes, 
4 REGULATION 38, 38 (1994), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv17n4/v17n4-
4.pdf. 
 97. Anatoli Kuprianov, Derivatives Debacles: Case Studies of Large Losses in Derivatives 
Markets, ECON. Q., Fall 1995, at 1. 
 98. Id. at 5. 
 99. Id. at 5–8. 
 100. Id. at 21–25. 
 101. Id. at 35. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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to fully appreciate “the nature or magnitude of the risks”105 and should 
“not have been so shocked.”106  In Barings’s case, management allowed a 
single trader to control the trading and the back office (which was sup-
posed to act as control of the trades).  The management seemed to have 
believed that the trader could earn such huge profits without risks.107  
“[R]egulation cannot substitute for sound management practices.  At the 
same time, government policymakers can act to minimize the potential 
for disruption to financial markets by promoting laws and policies that 
minimize legal risk.” 108 
Therefore, the management’s duty of care should become stric-
ter and carry far more enforcement in the future than it currently 
does.  Alternatively, or in addition, management should share in the risk 
it creates for shareholders.  Regulation may impose on management part 
of the risk that it imposes on the owners who have entrusted their money 
to these managers.  A similar rule should apply to brokers, dealers, ana-
lysts, rating agencies, and other financial market intermediaries.  If they 
spread risk, they should take advantage of the gains, but they should also 
always share in the losses.  The higher their gains, the higher their part of 
the losses should be.109  The pain would be a good control mechanism for 
risk-taking.  If intermediaries who control have close to no economic 
incentive to protect owners against risks of losses, then disclosure and 
the imposition of fiduciary duties may not be enough.110 
To be sure, as fiduciaries, these intermediaries must be accountable.  
However, in an intermediaries’ culture that values self-gratification and 
intermediaries’ creativity, disclosure and feeble remedies on breach of 
fiduciary duties may not be enough.  Therefore, self-interest should be 
used to impose a shared risk of loss.  Brokers who sold auction notes as 
cash, without understanding how the notes work, should be paid in such 
notes, and own a portion of their assets in such notes.  Managers of bro-
ker-dealer institutions that employed these brokers should own the notes 
they enable their brokers to sell.  The percentage of the ownership should 
be reasonable and not merely symbolic.111 
                                                 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 36. 
 109. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (2006) (prohibiting performance fees under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940). 
 110. See, e.g., Charles Davi, How to Understand the Derivatives Market, ATLANTIC, July 16, 
2009 (discussing market makers, the buy and sell side of derivative trading, and inter-dealer trading), 
available at http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/07/understanding_the_otc_derivatives_ mar-
ket.php. 
 111. This idea is not new.  At the beginning of the 1900s, corporate law took into consideration 
“directors’ qualifying shares.”  Directors had to own the corporations’ shares which they managed.  
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Regulations of specific innovations are likely to differ.  After all, 
not all couplings and decouplings pose the same type and magnitude of 
problems and risks to the financial system. Optimal regulation should 
encourage innovations but control excesses and abuse that might threaten 
the financial system and the economy. After all, everything good that 
sustains us, such as food and water, can be deadly as well. Therefore, the 
issue is not only the choice between “free markets” and “regulation.”  
The issue is mainly: where do the real problems reside and how should 
they be addressed? 
Regulation should govern situations in which self-protection by 
owners and market actors’ advice has proven to be faulty.  Innova-
tions may increase the cost of information for owners.  If the cost is too 
high, owners will rely on others to evaluate the benefits and risks of the 
innovations.  If the others prove to be unreliable, such as the rating agen-
cies in the case of sub-prime mortgages, a “run” by the owners is more 
likely, and regulation is necessary to restore the owners’ belief and trust.  
Further, regulation provides owners with a feeling of assurance that the 
intermediaries and managers, who hold owners’ money and assets, will 
not greatly abuse their entrustment and will balance risk and returns well.  
Therefore, the owners are less vigilant in protecting themselves from 
abuse by those who hold and manage their money and assets.  When dis-
closure is either ineffective or extremely undesirable to the innovations, 
substantive regulation may be the solution.  However, without enforce-
ment, these regulations on which owners will rely might produce no su-
pervision at all. 
Some innovations can be beneficial to intermediaries and toxic 
to the owners.  The United States has nurtured the financial system by 
feeding its intermediaries.  This country has been the leader in financial 
system innovations and has increased the size of its financial system.  It 
converted production into financial services and sales.  The highest paid 
persons in the United States are financial intermediaries and managers of 
financial and corporate enterprises that have grown by acquisitions and 
borrowing.112  Tax and other incentives have enticed Americans to trade 
                                                                                                             
The qualifying shares dwindled to one cent or one dollar, and the requirement was omitted altogeth-
er.  See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 3.1.2a (2000). 
 112. See, e.g., TARP Oversight: Is TARP Working for Main Street?: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (statement of Dean Baker, Co-Director, Center for Economic and Policy Research)  
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Paychecks May Wither, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at 1B (“[I]nvestment banks, not to mention 
hedge funds and private equity funds, pay far better than companies in other industries.”); Posting of 
David to Business Pundit, 12 Highest Paid People of 2009, http://www.businesspundit.com/12-
highest-paid-people-of-2009 (Dec. 28, 2009) (stating that highest-paid person is co-founder of a 
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in financial assets.113  Savings have been channeled to the financial sys-
tem.114  Not surprisingly, the United States has been the leader of the 
2008 bubble and crash.  It is unclear whether nurturing the system, inno-
vations of whatever kind, and high payment to its leaders is beneficial to 
the country and its owners.  Thus, innovations may be toxic but innova-
tors and their partners have no incentive to limit the innovations’ poten-
tial harm.  This is where regulation and enforcement must interfere. 
In addition, regulation affects not only current benefits and 
costs.  Regulation or absence of regulation affects the pattern of actors’ 
behavior—their habits and values.  Thus, regulation is successful when it 
allows innovations but monitors and evaluates them not only by mar-
ket reactions but also by non-market actors who focus on the risk from 
innovations to the system as a whole.  Rewards for low risk might prec-
lude some innovations, but also protect against disastrous system fail-
ures.  If the innovations share some of the pain of these disasters, they 
may be the best regulators and enforcers of the problem. 
C. Where Is Decoupling Headed?115 
One might speculate rather than purport to predict.  Focusing on the 
actors’ incentives, one strong indication can be derived from the benefits 
of innovations to investors.  Creating most such innovations involves less 
expense than creating innovations in real assets.  I therefore expect de-
coupling to continue, subject to limitations by law.  Owners and financial 
intermediaries (as well as those who are hired or financed by intermedia-
ries) will gain short-term.  Long-term owners, however, will bear future 
risks.  These risks may be hidden or seem lower than they turn out to be 
and cannot be measured accurately in magnitude and time. 
From Banks to Markets.  I expect financial intermediaries to press 
very hard for moving from institutional intermediation—such as banks 
and insurance—to market intermediation—such as investment banks, 
underwriters, broker dealers, and various financial advisers.  In fact, 
                                                                                                             
private-equity firm; second-highest is CEO of a technology firm; fourth-highest is CEO of petroleum 
firm). 
 113. E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 163 (2006 & Supp. I 2007), as amended by American Recovery and 
Investment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1232, 123 Stat. 115, 341 (providing deduction for 
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treatment for real estate mortgage investment conduits). 
 114. E.g., Too Big to Fail? The Role of Antitrust Law in Government-Funded Consolidation in 
the Banking Industry: Hearing Before the Courts and Competition Policy Subcomm. of the H. Judi-
ciary Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of William Askew, Senior Policy Advisor, Financial 
Services Roundtable) (stating his belief that savings flowing into financial system was one of several 
factors causing the credit crisis). 
 115. Robert Ahdieh asked these questions at the conference held on November 7, 2009 at 
Seattle University School of Law. 
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banks will seek both government cheap money and the freedom to trade 
in the markets.  Market intermediaries can innovate more freely, but the 
combined market and banking intermediaries might see new unexpected 
innovations, as securitization has demonstrated. 
If the financial sector continues to be profitable, it will grow 
both in assets and talent.  Even though not all talented young persons 
will be drawn to the financial sector, a sufficient number of talented per-
sons who seek money will.  It may well be that financial intermediation 
will spread to producers and sales organizations, and they might slice and 
dice promises through new and different means.  “Risk protection” kinds 
of derivatives will also continue to spread, bringing immediate specific 
income for promises to cover risk that is less ascertained. 
Intermediaries will press to eliminate the current differences 
between various financial assets (promises).  The differences between 
equity and debt, ownership and fiduciary entrustment, private market and 
public market, risk and benefits, guarantees, insurance, and rating may 
all disappear.  Instead of costly information, we might be offered ma-
thematical formulas or letters, numerical evaluations, and measurements 
of benefits and risk.  Regulation might be substantive, focusing on the 
ability of the issuers and intermediaries to meet their promises.  Admit-
tedly, in the short-term, this scenario is theoretical.  Humans are the cap-
tives of habit. Institutions do not change fast, regardless of exciting inno-
vations. 
More likely, financial innovations will be supervised with great-
er care, both within the institutions that create and buy them, and by 
the government.  We will continue to follow the same principles, and 
perhaps impose on the promisors a greater burden to protect the promises 
from significant risks.  There are no signs of imposing specialization on 
financial intermediaries, such as the Glass-Steagall Act.116  But, the fu-
ture may be entirely different. 
D.  What Regulation Can We Expect for Current Decouplings? 
When are disclosure and the imposition of fiduciary duties suf-
ficient to curb decoupling abuse, if ever?  Professors Hu and Black 
proposed enhanced disclosure of economic ownership (or lack of owner-
ship), following generally the recent regulation in England and Hong 
                                                 
 116. Even Allan Sloan, who berated bank managers in his column on January 19, 2010, and 
suggested that large institutions should split their safe and risky activities into separate operations, 
did not mention the Glass-Steagall Act. Presumably, market intermediaries grew at the expense of 
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Kong.117  “[L]arge shareholder disclosure under Schedule 13D or 13G 
focuses on voting ownership.”118  Whether disclosure would enable mar-
ket purchasers to understand what they are buying is questionable.119  
Indeed, complex instruments, described in Part Two, may perhaps be 
regulated by disclosure.  After a conference on March 23, 2009, FINRA 
decided to issue an investor alert on reverse convertibles:120  “The short-
term structures pay a monthly coupon and return investor principal in the 
underlying stock if it has fallen by a certain amount.  They have [always] 
been the dominant product in the US market, . . .  but have been heavily 
punished by falling equity markets, with the majority returning principal 
in stock over recent months.”121  “[FINRA] is treading carefully given 
the circumstances and what has happened in the industry. . . .   This is 
why it is communicating with investors rather than developing a new 
enforcement.”122  FINRA is “trying not to fan the flames, and to get in-
vestors through the difficult period that they are facing,” and is con-
cerned “over disclosure in the offering material that accompanied notes 
and the suitability of the individuals who are investing in the struc-
tures.”123 
Should similar regulation apply to contracts and property?  
Decoupling should be divided into agreements among discrete parties 
that are aware of each other before they enter the agreements and trade in 
promises.  In both this case and in market trading, the parties could em-
ploy brokers.  In the markets, however, parties know the brokers rather 
than the identity of the other parties.  Knowing one’s counterparty should 
be the dividing line and test between contract and market transactions.  
Attempts to hide, let alone hiding, the trades of agreements should be a 
criminal offense.  While agreements may be left to contract law subject 
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 118. Id. at 882. 
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 122. Id. (quoting Richard Vagnoni). 
 123. Id. (quoting Richard Vagnoni). 
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to interference of the law when specific problems arise, trading in finan-
cial promises and risks must be backed by substantive regulation to en-
sure that the promisors are able to meet their promises.  Otherwise, the 
financial system, and consequently the economy, may be threatened. 124 
When, if at all, should institutional investors be regulated?  If 
complex, combined, decoupled instruments, such as bonds that carry 
shareholder risks, are truly wagers, I assume that investors may speculate 
with their own money.  However, institutional investors should not be 
allowed to use entrusted money and assets to engage in wagering, even 
when they receive express permission from the true owners.  If the own-
ers wish to gamble, they must do so by exercising their control over their 
own money (not that of others). 
E.  A Radical Regulatory View May Be Worth Examining 
Intermediaries that create financial risk for others should retain 
some of the risk that they create.  Insured institutions and persons that 
create excessive risks for their insurers should retain some of the risks.  
Insurance companies know how to do that to protect themselves against 
the “moral hazards” of the insured.  They do that through “deductibles, 
co-payments, exclusions, and experience rating.”125  “A deductible is the 
exclusion of a certain amount of expense from coverage; coinsurance 
requires the individual to pay some fraction of each dollar of cost.”126  
Deductibles do not deter people from using insurance.127  However, co-
insurance varies inversely with the use of insurance.  The higher the per-
centage of co-insurance and the more the insured must pay the less insur-
ance the co-insurer will use.128  “Exclusions serve to narrow the types of 
risks that are covered by a policy, e.g., most (if not all) policies exclude 
losses that result from intentional acts of the insured.”129  The same prin-
                                                 
 124. Interview with Nicholas Valerio III, supra note 72. 
 125. Eric D. Beal, Posner and Moral Hazard, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 81, 86 (2000–2001). 
 126. Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531, 535 n.4 
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 127. In a study regarding medical insurance, Mark V. Pauly finds that “the deductible either (a) 
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the deductible.”  Id. at 536. 
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tage of the cost of each unit of medical care at which the utility gain to the individual from having an 
additional small fraction of the cost of each unit of care covered by insurance equals the utility loss 
to him upon having to pay for the ‘excess’ units of care whose consumption the additional coverage 
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 129. Beal, supra note 125, at 86–87 (footnote omitted).  “[A]n experience rating is the insu-
reds’ ‘track record’; greater losses result in higher premiums.”  Id. at 87. 
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ciples should apply to lenders who sell loans and to managers who man-
age other people’s money, whether they are investment advisers or direc-
tors and officers of a corporation.  The same principles should apply to 
investment bankers and brokers who offer auction notes. Intermediaries 
engaged in the financial system should carry some of the risk that they 
create for others, and that risk cannot be transferred.  To be sure, both 
intermediaries and their clients may seek coverage for the risks they take 
that affect others.  In such a case, however, the intermediaries will bear 
higher costs than others that are more cautious.  Let the example of such 
coverage be the one that has been adopted by insurance companies for 
many years as deductibles.130 
I conclude that the latest financial innovations have undermined 
ownership protection.  These decouplings have not offered owners any 
risk protection.  The reverse is true: the decouplings have benefitted in-
termediaries at the risk and expense of the owners.  Never before has 
ownership been exposed to so much risk from those who control, and 
never before, not even during the 1920s, have innovations played such a 
deceptive role in giving free and unaccountable control over ownership.  
The time has come to focus on the separation of control from accounta-
bility to owners.  This should be the focus of the future regulation. 
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